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Abstract. very recent trend has emerged to couple the notion of inter-
pretability and adversarial robustness, unlike earlier efforts which solely
focused on good interpretations or robustness against adversaries. Works
have shown that adversarially trained models exhibit more interpretable
saliency maps than their non-robust counterparts, and that this behav-
ior can be quantified by considering the alignment between input image
and saliency map. In this work, we provide a different perspective to
this coupling, and provide a method, Saliency based Adversarial train-
ing (SAT), to use saliency maps to improve adversarial robustness of a
model. In particular, we show that using annotations such as bound-
ing boxes and segmentation masks, already provided with a dataset, as
weak saliency maps, suffices to improve adversarial robustness with no
additional effort to generate the perturbations themselves. Our empir-
ical results on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, Tiny ImageNet and Flower-17
datasets consistently corroborate our claim, by showing improved adver-
sarial robustness using our method. saliency maps. We also show how
using finer and stronger saliency maps leads to more robust models, and
how integrating SAT with existing adversarial training methods, further
boosts performance of these existing methods.
Keywords: Adversarial Robustness · Saliency Maps · Deep Neural Net-
works
1 Introduction
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have become vital to solve many tasks across
domains including image/text/graph classification and generation, object recog-
nition, segmentation, speech recognition, etc. As the applications of DNNs widen
in scope, robustness and interpretability are two important parameters that de-
fine the goodness of a trained DNN model. While on one hand the deep network
should be robust to imperceptible perturbations, on the other hand it should
be interpretable enough to be trusted when practically used in domains like au-
tonomous navigation or healthcare. Keeping in mind the vulnerability of deep
networks to adversarial attacks [27], efforts have been undertaken to make them
more robust to these attacks. Among the proposed methodologies, Adversarial
Training (AT) [16,11] has emerged as one of the best defenses wherein networks
are trained on adversarial examples to better classify them at test time. On the
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other hand, in order to generate an interpretable explanation to a network predic-
tion, many methods have been proposed lately, of which guided-backpropagation
(GBP)[25], GradCAM++ [3], Integrated Gradients (IG) [26] and fine-grained vi-
sualisations (FGVis) [29] are popular to name a few.
Most work so far on interpretability and adversarial robustness have focused
on either of them alone. Very recently, over the last few months, there has been a
new interest in coupling the two notions and aiming to understand the connection
between robustness and interpretability [8,9,28,36,4,2]. The few existing efforts
can be categorized broadly into three kinds: (i) Efforts [36,28] which have shown
that explanations generated by more robust models are more interpretable than
their non-robust counterparts; (ii) Efforts that have attempted to theoretically
analyze the relationship between adversarial robustness and interpretability (for
e.g., [8] obtains an inequality between these notions which holds to equality
in case of linear models, and [12] relates the two using a generalized form of
hitting set duality); and (iii) Efforts [4,2], more recent, that have attempted to
improve robustness by training models with additional objectives that constrain
the image explanations to be more interpretable and robust towards attribution
attacks. All of these efforts are recent, and more work needs to be done to
explore the connections better. In this work, we provide a different, yet simple
and effective, approach to leverage saliency maps for adversarial robustness. We
observe that adversarial perturbations correspond to class-discriminative pixels
in later stages of training (see Figure 1), and exploit this observation to use the
saliency map (static) of a given image, whilst training to improve robustness.
For datasets where bounding boxes and segmentation masks are provided, we
demonstrate that one can exploit these, in lieu of saliency maps, to improve
model robustness using our approach. Our work would be closest to the third
category of methods described above, and we differentiate from these other recent
efforts further in Section 2.
Generally speaking, humans tend to learn new tasks in a robust, generaliz-
able fashion when provided with explanations during their learning phase. For
example, a medical student learns about a disease better when provided with
explanations of how the disease acts inside the body, rather than just the descrip-
tion of external symptoms. A person may otherwise learn irrelevant relationships
without knowledge of underlying explanations. Similarly, we opine that a DNN
model that is trained with explanations is less easily fooled by adversarial per-
turbations. Little has been explored in this direction, and we aim to leverage this
relationship to provide an efficient methodology for adversarial robustness. We
differ from earlier efforts in our primary objective that we use explanations to
generate pseudo-adversarial examples instead of using them as a regularization
term like [4,2] (more in Section 2). In particular, we provide a simple yet effective
methodology (as compared to a recent effort such as [12], which is NP-hard) that
improves model robustness using saliency maps or already provided bounding
boxes or segmentation masks.
Our key contributions can be summarized as follows: (i) We observe a tan-
gible relationship between a saliency map and adversarial perturbations for a
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given image, and leverage this observation to propose a new methodology that
uses the saliency map of the image to mimic adversarial training; (ii) We show
through our empirical studies on widely used datasets: CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100,
Tiny ImageNet and Flowers-17, to show the improvement in adversarial robust-
ness through our proposed method; (iii) We show that the improvement becomes
more pronounced when a finer and stronger saliency map is used, signifying a
strong correlation between saliency maps and adversarial robustness; (iv) When
bounding boxes or segmentation masks are already available in a dataset (e.g.
Tiny ImageNet or Flowers), we demonstrate that our methodology improves ad-
versarial robustness with no additional cost to generate perturbations for train-
ing; (v) Additionally, we show that integrating our method with adversarial
training methods, such as PGD [16] and TRADES [34], further improves their
performance; and (vi) We perform detailed ablation studies to better charac-
terize the efficacy of our proposed methodology. We believe that this work can
contribute to opening up a rather new direction to enhance robustness of DNN
models.
2 Related Work
We review earlier efforts related to this work from multiple perspectives, as
described below.
Explanation methods: Various methods have been proposed over the last
few years to explain the decisions of a neural network. Backpropagation-based
methods find the importance of each pixel by backpropagating the class score
error to the input image. An improved and popular version of this, known as
Guided-Backpropagation [25], only keeps paths that lead to positive influence
on the class score, leading to much cleaner-looking explanations. SmoothGrad
[24], VarGrad [1] and Integrated gradients [26] refine the explanations by com-
bining/integrating gradients of multiple noisy/interpolated versions of the im-
age. Other backpropagation based methods like DeepLift [22], Excitation Back-
Prop [35] and Layerwise Relevance Propagation [15] generate explanations by
utilizing topdown relevance propagation rules. PatternNet and PatternAttribu-
tion [13] yields explanations that are theoretically sound for linear models and
produce improved explanations for deep networks. CAM [37], Grad-CAM [20],
Grad-CAM++ [3] form another variant of generating explanations known as
Activation-based methods. These methods use linear combinations of activations
of convolutional layers, with the weights for these combinations obtained using
gradients. Perturbation based methods generate attribution maps by examining
the change in prediction of the model when the input image is perturbed [18,32].
All the aforementioned methods however focus solely on explaining neural net-
work decisions.
Adversarial Attacks and Robustness: With the advancement of newer ad-
versarial attacks each year [11,16,30,34], methods have been proposed to defend
against them. Parseval Networks [5] train robust networks by constraining the
Lipschitz constant of its layers to be smaller than 1. Another category of methods
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harness the susceptibility of latent layers by performing latent adversarial train-
ing (LAT) [23] or using feature denoising [31]. Other methods like DefenseGAN
[19] exploit GANs wherein they learn the distribution of unperturbed images and
find the closest image for a given test image, to feed the network at inference
time. TRADES [34], more recently, presents a new defense method that provides
a trade-off between adversarial robustness and vanilla accuracy by decomposing
prediction error for adversarial examples (robust error) as the sum of natural
(classification) error and boundary error, and providing a differentiable upper
bound using theory based on classification-calibrated loss. Among the proposed
defenses against adversarial attacks, Adversarial Training (AT) [16,11] has re-
mained the most popular and widely used defense, where the network is trained
on adversarial examples in order to match the training data distribution with
that of adversarial test distribution. More recent efforts in this direction include
[21,33], which aim to reduce adversarial training overhead by recycling gradients
and accelerating via the maximal principle respectively. In this work, we focus on
adversarial training, considering it still remains the most reliable defense against
different attacks.
Interpretability and robustness: The last few months have seen a few ef-
forts on associating the notions of robustness and interpretability. These efforts
can be categorized into three kinds, as introduced briefly earlier: (i) The first
kind centers around interpreting how adversarially trained convolutional neural
networks (ATCNNs) recognize objects. Recent studies [36,28] have shown that
representations learned by ATCNNs are more biased towards image shape than
its texture. Also, these ATCNNs tend to evince more interpretable saliency maps
corresponding to their prediction than their non-robust equivalents. (ii) In the
second kind, inspired by [36,28], Etmann et al. [8] recently quantified this be-
havior of ATCNNs by considering the alignment between saliency map and the
image as the metric for interpretability. They confirmed that for a linear model,
the alignment grows strictly with robustness. For non-linear models such as neu-
ral networks, they show that the their linearized robustness is loosely bounded
by the alignment metric. [12], which is rather new, provides a theoretical con-
nection between adversarial examples and explanations by demonstrating that
both are related by a generalized form of hitting set duality. (iii) Encouraged
by the work of Etmann [8], a third category of work more recently sought to
answer the question: Do robust and interpretable saliency maps imply adversar-
ial robustness ? Recent efforts [7,10] have shown that the explanations of neural
networks can also be manipulated by adding perturbations to input examples,
which, instead of causing mis-classification, result in a different explanation. To
tackle this problem, a recent effort, Robust Attribution Regularization (RAR)
[4], aims to train networks by optimizing objectives with a regularization term
on explanations in order to achieve robust attributions.
In contrast to the abovementioned methods, our work explores a different
side to the connection between notions of interpretability and robustness. As ex-
plained in Section 1, we aim to generate adversarial perturbations from a given
saliency map to improve robustness while training a neural network. Our work
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is perhaps closest to RAR [4] in using explanations (saliency maps) during train-
ing, we however differ from them in our primary objective and in that we are
using explanations to generate adversarial examples, while RAR seeks to attain
attributional robustness. In terms of approach, although one could consider the
work by Ignatiev et al. [12] as related to ours, they had only preliminary results
on MNIST, and focused on providing a theoretical connection between adver-
sarial examples and explanations based on logic and constraint programming,
which may not scale to large-scale datasets. Our work attempts to show that ex-
planations can yield robustness in standard large-scale benchmark datasets in an
efficient way. We further hypothesize that, by advancement through our method,
we can actually take advantage of weak explanations like bounding boxes and
segmentation masks which may otherwise be left unexploited in a dataset, to
train adversarially robust models.
Fig. 1. Variation of adversarial perturbation with training epochs during 5-step PGD
adversarial training of Resnet-34 on CIFAR-10. We observe that adversarial perturba-
tions at later stages of training correspond to class-discriminative regions/pixels.
3 Using Saliency Maps for Efficient Adversarial Training
Our method is motivated by the observation that adversarial perturbations
at later stages of training correspond to class-discriminative regions/pixels, as
shown in Figure 1. We begin describing our method with the necessary notations
and preliminaries.
3.1 Notations and Preliminaries. We denote a neural network as Φ(. ; θ) :
Rd → Rk, parametrized by weights θ, which takes an input x ∈ Rd and outputs
a logit, Φi(x), for each of k classes, i.e. i ∈ C = {1, · · · , k}, C denoting the set
of class labels. Without loss of generality, considering an image classification
setting, we define a saliency map s corresponding to an input sample x as s ∈
[0, 1]d, where the presence of an object of interest in input x lies between 0
and 1. For a trained network Φ, the unnormalized saliency map for an input x
can simply be given as: ∇xΦi∗(x), where i∗ = arg maxi Φi(x). (In practice, this
gradient is at times computed w.r.t feature maps of intermediate layers, but we
leave our notations w.r.t x for ease of understanding.)
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) Attack: Prior efforts on adversarial attacks
[11] include the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM), a l∞-bounded single step
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attack which calculates an adversary as: x +  sign(∇xL (Φ(x, θ), y)). A more
powerful attack however is the popularly used multi-step variant, also called
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD), given by:
x0 = x; xt+1 = Πx+N
(
xt + α sign(∇xL (Φ(x, θ), y))
)
(1)
where α is the step size, Π is the projection function, and N is the space of
possible perturbations. We use PGD as the choice of attack in our experiments,
and later change to show (in Section 5) how our method performs against other
attacks.
Adversarial Training (AT): AT [11] is generally used to make the models adver-
sarially robust by matching the training distribution with the adversarial test
distribution. Essentially, for AT, the optimal parameter θ∗ is given by:
θ∗ = arg min
θ
E(x,y)∼D
[
max
δ∈N
L (Φ(x + δ, θ), y)
]
(2)
Here, the inner maximization maxδ∈N L (Φ(x + δ, θ), y) is calculated using a
strong adversarial attack such as PGD.
3.2 Saliency-Based Adversarial Training: Motivation. An adversarial per-
turbation at input x is given by:
arg inf
e ∈ Rd
{‖e‖ : arg max
i
Φi(x+ e) 6= arg max
i
Φi(x)} (3)
Etmann et al. [8] showed that for most multi-class neural networks, especially
ones with ReLU or Leaky ReLU activation functions, which we consider in this
work1, the network’s score function, Φ is sufficiently locally-linear in relevant
neighbourhood of input x, i.e.
Φi(x + e) ≈ Φi(x) + eT · ∇xΦi(x) (4)
Leveraging this, an adversarial perturbation, e, which is intended as a perturba-
tion to input x which results in a change of predicted label, can be modeled as
follows (given i, j ∈ C):
arg max
i
Φi(x+ e) 6= arg max
i
Φi(x) (5)
⇐⇒ ∃j 6= i∗ : Φj(x + e) > Φi∗(x + e) (6)
⇐⇒ ∃j 6= i∗ : eT · (∇xΦj(x)−∇xΦi∗(x)) > Φi∗(x)− Φj(x) (7)
The third inequality (7) comes from combining inequality (6) and expression
(4). The infimum over ‖e‖, which provides a minimal perturbation to change
1 In all our experiments, we train networks with ReLU activations which ensures that
this assumptions is met. We follow the experiments in [8] in this regard, to ensure
that our model is locally affine in a given data point’s neighborhood.
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the class label, is achieved by choosing e as a multiple of ∇x(Φj(x) − Φi∗(x)).
(In general, note that the LHS of eT z > c where c is a constant, is maximized
by e = ‖e‖ z‖z‖ , leading to ‖e‖‖z‖ > c. The infimum of e is then achieved by
choosing it as a multiple of z). The direction of adversarial perturbation then
becomes:
∇x(Φj(x)− Φi∗(x)) (8)
This perturbation direction depends on two quantities: (i) ∇xΦi∗(x) the saliency
map for the true class i∗; and (ii) ∇xΦj(x), the saliency map of x for class j for
which the infimum of e is attained. We now analyze the direction of adversarial
perturbation separately for the binary and multi-class cases.
Binary case: Let us consider a binary classifier h : x → {−1, 1} given by: h =
sign(Φ(x, θ)), where Φ(x, θ)) represents the logit of the positive class. Let Φ′(x)
denotes the logit of negative class. Applying a sigmoid activation function, we get
the probability of the positive and negative class as: P (y = +1|x) = 1
1+exp−Φ(x,θ)
and P (y = −1|x) = 1
1+exp−Φ′(x,θ)
respectively. It is simple to see that the prob-
ability of the negative class can also be written as:
P (y = −1|x) = 1− P (y = +1|x) = 1
1 + expΦ(x,θ)
Rather, the corresponding logit score of the negative class is −Φ(x, θ)). In Eqn
8 for a binary classifier, one can hence view Φj(x) = −Φi∗(x), and define the
adversarial perturbation direction in Eqn 8 simply as −∇x(Φi∗(x)).
Multi-class case: We extend a similar argument to the multi-class setting using
an approximation. The direction of adversarial perturbation in the multi-class
setting as give in Eqn 8 would require finding the class j for which the infimum
of ‖e‖ is attained. This requires computing the quantity in Eqn 8 for all classes,
and identifying the j 6= i∗ for which the quantity attains the least value. This is
compute-intensive. To avoid this computational overhead, we rely on Φi
∗
alone
(note that i∗, the ground truth label, is known to us at training), and simply
propose the use of −∇x(Φi∗(x)) as the direction of perturbation (as in the binary
case). We now argue that this approximation is a reasonable one. Considering
the multi-class setting as k binary classification problems, for the binary classifier
corresponding to the ground truth class i∗, we would have:
P (y 6= i∗|x) = 1− P (y = i∗|x) = 1
1 + expΦi
∗ (x,θ)
In other words, the corresponding logit score of the negative class is −Φi∗(x, θ)).
Approximating the direction of the adversarial perturbation as the average of
the directions of the perturbations across the k binary classification problems, we
would get the direction of the perturbation to be: ∇x(
∑
j 6=i∗ Φ
j(x) − kΦi∗(x)).
Assuming that each of the classes l 6= i∗ ∈ C is equally likely to be the j
that minimizes ‖e‖, it is evident that choosing −∇x(Φi∗(x)) as the direction of
perturbation would be the most conservative option in the expected sense. We
show through our experiments that this option works reasonably well.
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Since we deal with l∞-bounded perturbations in this work, following PGD
(Eqn 1), we use −sign (∇xΦi∗(x)) instead of −∇xΦi∗(x) itself as the pertur-
bation direction. We complete the above discussion by noting that ∇xΦi∗(x) is
the saliency map, s, defined at the beginning of this section. In other words, the
direction of adversarial perturbation can be obtained using a saliency map (as
we also show in our experiments).
Fig. 2. Adversarial attack ac-
curacy when perturbing input
example using the direction of
negative saliency on normally
(Std.) and adversarially (Adv.)
trained models on CIFAR-10
and CIFAR-100. Note that  = 0
denotes clean accuracy (no at-
tack), all other models face at-
tacks by saliency maps and have
lower accuracies.
To study the above claim, we conducted
experiments to check if the negative of the
saliency map corresponding to the ground
truth class, i.e. −∇xΦi∗(x), can indeed be
used as a direction to perturb input. We cre-
ated adversarial examples by perturbing orig-
inal examples as: x = x −  · sign(∇xΦi∗(x))
(using saliency maps) to attack a model.
We attack a Resnet-10 model trained on
CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets, normally
(Std.) and adversarially (Adv.) trained us-
ing 5-step PGD attack with 3 different
magnitudes of l∞-norm perturbations,  ∈
{2/255, 4/255, 8/255}. We report our find-
ings in Figure 2. The figure shows that,
examples generated by perturbing an input
in the direction of negative saliency de-
creases the model’s accuracy to a reason-
able extent, affecting models both models
trained normally and adversarially. We now
describe how we leverage this relationship to
perform Saliency-based Adversarial Training
(SAT).
3.3 Saliency-Based Adversarial Training: Algorithm. Algorithm 1 sum-
marizes our methodology of using saliency maps for adversarial training. The
saliency maps during training are obtained either through annotations provided
in a dataset (such as bounding boxes or segmentation masks), or through a pre-
trained model which is used only to get saliency maps. More details on obtaining
saliency maps is discussed in Section 4.
We also observed in our studies that when training a network using adversar-
ial training, during the initial phase of training when the weights are not optimal,
the perturbations computed by the attack methods are random. But with train-
ing, as weights become optimal, they become more class-discriminative. Figure 1
illustrates this observation, where the perturbation is random in initial phases of
training but eventually becomes class-discriminative as the model trains. We ex-
ploit this observation to complete our methodology. In order to mimic the above
behavior of the perturbation over training, we choose the direction of perturba-
tion in a stochastic manner. We choose the ith component δt[i] of perturbation
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δt at time t as:
δt[i] =
{
z[i], with probability αt
−s[i], with probability 1− αt (9)
where z ∈ {−1, 1}d is sampled randomly, and 0 < α < 1. During initial epochs
of training, when αt is close to 1, δt will be dominated by random values. How-
ever, as training proceeds and αt starts diminishing, δt smoothly transitions
to −s and will be influenced by the adversarial character of the saliency map.
Algorithm 1: Saliency-based Adversarial
Training (SAT) Methodology
Input: Training Dataset D, Saliency Maps S,
Model Φ(. ; θ), SAT hyperparameter α,
Learning rate η, Maximum l∞ perturbation 0
Output: Optimal parameter θ∗
Initialize model parameters as θ = θ0.
for t ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} do
Sample training data of size B : {(xi, yi)}
from D.
Pick out corresponding saliency maps : {si}
from S.
Calculate δti for each xi using Equation 9.
Perturb the input examples :
xi := xi + 0 · δti.
Perform clipping to keep xi bounded : xi :=
clip(xi).
Update model parameters :
θt := θt−1− η ·Oθ 1B
∑B
i=1 L (Φ(xi, θt−1), yi)
end
When additional annota-
tions such as bounding
boxes or segmentation masks
are available in a dataset,
our approach considers these
as weak saliency maps for
the methodology. Usually,
bounding boxes or segmen-
tation masks are available
as single channel images.
To use them in our al-
gorithm, we concatenate
them along channel dimen-
sion to get the required
dimension as image. Af-
ter this pre-processing, we
generate the weak saliency,
s˜ from bounding boxes or
segmentation masks as:
s˜[i] =
{
1, if ith pixel lies inside bbox or seg masks
−1, otherwise (10)
As mentioned earlier, using these bounding boxes or segmentation masks as
saliency maps allows us to perform adversarial training with no additional cost
to compute perturbations, unlike existing adversarial training methods which
can be compute-intensive.
4 Experiments and Results
In this section, we present our results using the proposed SAT method (Algo-
rithm 1) on multiple datasets with different variations of saliency maps. We begin
with describing the datasets, evaluation criteria and implementation details.
4.1 Experimental Setup Datasets and Evaluation Criteria: We per-
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form experiments on well-known datasets: CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 [14], Tiny Im-
ageNet [6] and FLOWER-17 [17]. We evaluate the adversarial robustness of
trained models (model accuracy when perturbations from following attacks are
provided as inputs, as done in all earlier related efforts - also called adversarial ac-
curacy) using the popular and widely used PGD attack (described in Sec 3) with
5 steps and 4 different levels of l∞ perturbation 0 ∈ {1/255, 2/255, 3/255, 4/255}.
We also evaluate the robustness of our models against other attacks: TRADES
[34] as well as uniform noise in Sec 5. We trained all our models for 5 trials and
observed minimal variations in the values. We hence report the mean value of
our experiments in our tables.
Baselines: We compare our method with multiple baseline methods, including
those that train adversarially, as well as those that don’t train adversarially: (i)
Original Model: Model trained normally with no adversarial training; (ii) PGD-
AT: Model trained adversarially using 5-step PGD attack with max l∞ pertur-
bation and  = 8/255, as in [16]; (iii) TRADES-AT: Model trained adversarially
using TRADES attack with max l∞ perturbation and  = 8/255, as in [34]; (iv)
Original + Uniform Noise: Model trained normally with no adversarial train-
ing, but training data is perturbed with uniform noise sampled from [ −8255 ,
8
255 ]
during training; (v) PGD + Uniform Noise: PGD-AT, described in (ii), train-
ing data is additionally perturbed with uniform noise sampled from [ −8255 ,
8
255 ]
during training; (vi) TRADES + Uniform Noise: TRADES-AT, described in
(iii), training data is additionally perturbed with uniform noise sampled from
[ −8255 ,
8
255 ] during training. The models are trained for 100 epochs with standard
cross-entropy loss, minimized using Adam optimizer (learning rate = 1e− 3).
Implementation Details: As in Sec 3, our method relies on being provided
with a saliency map for the ground truth label of a given image, while training the
model. For Tiny ImageNet and FLOWER-17, we simply use the bounding boxes
and segmentation masks provided in the dataset (and left unexploited often)
as ‘weak’ saliency maps to train the model using the proposed SAT method.
This thus incurs no additional cost when compared to competing methods that
perform adversarial training by generating perturbations (a costly operation
when using methods such as PGD). For CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100, since we do
not have such information (bounding boxes/segmentation masks) provided, we
obtain saliency maps using teacher networks. In particular, we train two teacher
networks: Resnet-10 and Resnet-34 for this purpose. Our final model architecture
in all these settings is a Resnet34 too.
Fig. 3. Saliency maps of non-robust (top,
model trained normally) and robust (bot-
tom, model trained adversarially) variants
of Resnet-10 with different explanation
methods on CIFAR-10.
To go further, we also consider
multiple variants of the above choices
to study our method more carefully. It
is believed that the quality of saliency
maps generated by an adversarially
trained model is better than its non-
robust equivalent [28]. Figure 3 sup-
ports the above claim. We hence train
the aforementioned teacher models in
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two ways: Standard (denoted as Std in the results) and Adversarial (denoted as
Adv in results) (regular PGD-based adversarial training), and use the saliency
maps for the ground truth class. The saliency maps themselves are generated
in two ways: we use bounding boxes obtained using Grad-CAM++ [3] as weak
saliency maps, and we use the finer saliency maps generated as is by Guided
Back-propagation (GBP) [25] to train our student model. We set hyperparame-
ters α = (0.6)
1
10 and 0 =
8
255 , and minimize cross-entropy loss using an Adam
optimizer (learning rate = 1e− 3) for 200 epochs.
To complete the study, we also use variants of our method: PGD-SAT and
TRADES-SAT, where we perturb the input randomly with either perturbations
calculated by SAT or with PGD/TRADES attacks. All these variants are named
in a self-explanatory manner in our results: X — Y — Z, where X denotes the
teacher model (Resnet-10/-34), Y denotes the mode of training (Std or Adv),
and Z denotes the saliency map method (GBP/ GradCAM++) used.In Sec 5,
we also perform additional studies with other saliency methods like Guided-
GradCAM++, Smooth-Grad and Integrated-Gradients to study the generaliz-
ability of our results on varying quality of saliencies.
4.2 Results
Tables 1 and 2 present our results on CIFAR-10 + CIFAR-100 and Tiny Ima-
geNet + Flower-17 datasets respectively. We note again that the provided bound-
ing boxes are used as saliency maps in Tiny ImageNet, and segmentation masks
provided in Flower-17 are used as saliency maps. We note that with no addi-
tional cost of computing perturbations, we obtain improvement of 2 − 4% in
robustness. Table 1 shows the results for CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100, and demon-
strates the potential of using saliency maps for adversarial training. Barring 1-2
cases, the proposed SAT (or its combination with an adversarial training method
such as PGD or TRADES) performs better than respective baselines across the
results. As the adversarial attack gets stronger (larger ), adding SAT to exist-
ing methods significantly improves robustness performance ( 1-3% in adversarial
accuracy). It is also evident from Table 1 that using finer saliency maps (GBP
in our results) obtains better performance than weaker saliency maps (bounding
boxes obtained from GradCAM++, in our case). This supports the inference
that a stronger saliency map provides better adversarial robustness. We also
notice, as pointed out earlier in this section (Fig 3), that using saliency maps
obtained from an adversarially trained teacher leads to significant gains in ro-
bustness/adversarial accuracy performance. In other words, all our experiments
point to the inference that better the saliency maps, better the adversarial ro-
bustness of the model trained using our approach. This further supports our
inherent claim that saliency maps do provide adversarial robustness.
Table 1 also shows that PGD-SAT and TRADES-SAT leads to improvement
( 1.5 − 3%) over vanilla PGD and TRADES adversarial training. This shows
that adding our saliency-based method to existing adversarial training method
further improves their performance. We observe here again that using saliency
maps of an adversarially robust teacher model proves more useful than those
obtained from a normal teacher model.
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Method CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100
 = 1/255  = 2/255  = 3/255  = 4/255  = 1/255  = 2/255  = 3/255  = 4/255
Original 47.71 10.36 1.39 0.28 25.83 7.76 3.35 1.94
Original + Uniform-Noise 61.23 22.85 6.34 2.56 33.15 13.50 6.01 3.22
SAT (Weak saliency)
Resnet-10 — Std. — G.CAM++ 59.61 22.12 6.16 1.77 31.98 11.93 5.48 2.89
Resnet-10 — Adv. — G.CAM++ 57.34 19.94 5.64 1.91 32.88 13.3 6.31 4.0
Resnet-34 — Std. — G.CAM++ 56.75 20.62 6.02 1.74 30.95 12.68 5.65 3.25
Resnet-34 — Adv. — G.CAM++ 60.0 22.94 6.58 1.96 32.96 12.07 5.2 3.04
SAT (Fine saliency)
Resnet-10 — Std. — GBP 10.87 0.95 0.0 0.0 20.53 7.52 3.5 2.12
Resnet-10 — Adv. — GBP 63.33 26.79 9.62 3.69 34.29 14.73 6.84 4.22
Resnet-34 — Std. — GBP 18.01 2.54 1.25 1.0 9.91 2.52 1.05 0.54
Resnet-34 — Adv. — GBP 62.67 23.76 5.82 1.28 34.71 14.32 7.08 4.29
PGD 77.89 73.1 66.96 61.18 45.75 40.13 35.41 31.01
PGD + Uniform-Noise 82.23 74.97 65.61 55.04 42.67 36.10 30.64
PGD-SAT
Resnet-10 — Std. — GBP 79.72 73.81 67.72 61.29 46.87 41.11 35.77 30.75
Resnet-10 — Adv. — GBP 80.72 75.07 68.68 62.49 48.33 42.2 36.33 31.66
Resnet-34 — Std. — GBP 79.53 74.2 68.19 62.48 46.66 40.95 35.73 30.83
Resnet-34 — Adv. — GBP 80.15 74.60 68.47 62.53 47.38 42.0 36.34 31.53
Resnet-10 — Adv. — G.CAM++ 79.67 74.05 68.12 61.84 47.28 41.72 35.99 31.05
Resnet-34 — Adv. — G.CAM++ 79.74 74.5 68.87 62.68 46.12 40.47 35.31 30.81
TRADES 84.0 73.25 59.79 47.03 47.21 42.2 37.03 32.96
TRADES + Uniform-Noise 81.69 74.96 67.43 60.05 51.90 42.85 37.30 31.71
TRADES-SAT
Resnet-10 — Std. — GBP 80.15 75.2 69.0 63.2 48.63 42.91 37.79 33.19
Resnet-10 — Adv. — GBP 80.65 75.38 69.28 63.46 48.74 42.99 37.83 33.23
Resnet-34 — Std. — GBP 79.98 74.5 68.56 62.43 48.5 42.41 36.93 32.01
Resnet-34 — Adv. — GBP 80.26 74.87 68.75 62.74 48.76 42.83 37.36 32.87
Resnet-10 — Adv. — G.CAM++ 79.85 74.61 69.07 63.2 48.99 43.05 37.4 32.84
Resnet-34 — Adv. — G.CAM++ 83.17 77.18 70.27 62.87 49.35 43.62 38.53 33.93
Table 1. Results on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 using saliency maps from different
teachers and explanation methods.  ∈ {1/255, 2/255, 3/255, 4/255} denotes the maxi-
mum l∞ perturbation allowed in 5-step PGD attack (More the , stronger the attack).
GBP: Guided-Backpropagation; G.CAM++: Grad-CAM++.
Method Tiny-Imagenet FLOWER-17
 = 1/255  = 2/255  = 3/255  = 1/255  = 2/255  = 3/255
Original 1.04 0.4 0.0 63.2 48.01 34.2
Original + Uniform-Noise 9.45 2.32 0.77 64.56 50.43 36.2
SAT 9.79 2.46 0.77 66.17 52.94 38.93
PGD 18.91 14.34 11.37 72.38 70.4 70.3
PGD + Uniform-Noise 19.57 15.49 11.66 73.52 72.79 72.71
PGD-SAT 20.56 16.38 12.91 78.67 75.73 75.00
TRADES 18.45 16.76 11.09 74.56 73.89 73.67
TRADES + Uniform-Noise 19.96 16.13 12.58 76.47 74.26 74.0
TRADES-SAT 20.04 16.45 12.96 79.41 77.94 77.20
Table 2. Results on Tiny-Imagenet and Flower-17 datasets where bounding boxes and
segmentation masks provided with the dataset are used as saliency maps, respectively.
 ∈ {1/255, 2/255, 3/255} denotes the maximum l∞ perturbation allowed in 5-step
PGD attack (More the , stronger the attack).
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Fig. 4. Training time for one epoch
in seconds (averaged over 10 trials)
for different methods considered in
our results on Tiny-Imagenet and
Flower-17.
Time Efficiency: We further analyzed the
training efficiency of the proposed method.
Figure 6 reports the average time taken by
one epoch over 10 trials. As can be seen,
PGD-SAT and TRADES-SAT require only
≈ 50−70% of training time when compared to
vanilla PGD and TRADES respectively, and
at the same time, achieves superior perfor-
mance (as in Table 2). In case of vanilla SAT,
the behavior is desirable since we observe an
increase in robustness without compromising
much in training time. We assume in these
results that explanations are provided to us,
inspiring the demand for finer saliency map
annotations to be included in vision datasets to the community. Similar results
for CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 are included in the appendix.
5 Discussions, Ablation Studies and Conclusions
We carried out ablation studies to better characterize the efficacy of our method-
ology, and present these results in this section. Unless explicitly specified, these
experiments are carried out on CIFAR-100 using GuidedBackprop and Grad-
CAM++ explanations of a standard and adversarially trained Resnet-10 teacher.
Fig. 5. Variation of hyper-parameter α and
0 on CIFAR-100 dataset.
Varying Hyperparameters: We
studied the effect on the adversarial
robustness of our trained model by
varying the hyperparameters α and
0 in our method. Fig 5 shows these
results, where all models are evalu-
ated using a 5-Step PGD attack with
l∞ norm and maximum perturbation
 ∈ { 1255 , 2255 , 3255}. We achieve higher
robustness when α10 is set closer to 1
(α close to 1), which from Eqn 9 in-
dicates that the saliency map is useful to obtain perturbations in later stages
of training, as explained before. Interestingly, when α10 is close to 0 (α close
to 0), the training doesn’t include any noise factor, and since we have a fixed
saliency map for each image, it becomes equivalent to training on an additively
shifted version of the original training data resulting in a less robust model.
While varying 0 in Algorithm 1, we observe a peak in robustness somewhere in
the middle of the considered range of values. In Algorithm 1, the distribution of
our estimated perturbations and actual adversarial perturbations depend on the
hyperparameter 0. At 0 = 0, the distributions are identical, and the distribu-
tions diverge as 0 increases. Hence, at high values of 0, when both distributions
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diverge, the perturbations used by SAT no longer resemble true adversarial per-
turbations, hence resulting in less robust models (when attacked adversarially
using methods associated with the adversarial perturbations). In other words,
the perturbations provided by saliency maps in our method has reasonable con-
junction with standard adversarial perturbations, as shown in Fig 2.
Method PGD
1
255
2
255
3
255
4
255
Original 25.83 7.76 3.35 1.94
Original + Uniform-Noise 33.15 13.50 6.01 3.22
SAT
Resnet-10 — Std. — GBP 20.53 7.52 3.5 2.12
Resnet-10 — Std. — S.Grad 39.22 19.89 9.44 4.49
Resnet-10 — Std. — G.G.CAM++ 21.46 8.00 3.53 2.23
Resnet-10 — Std. — I.Grad 36.2 5.43 7.28 3.37
Resnet-10 — Adv. — GBP 34.29 14.73 6.84 4.22
Resnet-10 — Adv. — S.Grad 40.01 21.2 10.96 4.85
Resnet-10 — Adv. — G.G.CAM++ 34.07 13.18 5.85 3.09
Resnet-10 — Adv. — I.Grad 37.56 16.45 7.55 4.31
Table 3. Results using saliency maps
from Guided-Backprop (GBP), Smooth-
Grad (S.Grad), Integrated-Gradients
(I.Grad), and Guided-Grad-CAM++
(G.G.CAM++)
Robustness against Other At-
tacks: In Table 1, we evaluate our
models using the widely used PGD at-
tack. We now study how the proposed
method works against other attacks -
in particular, Uniform Noise attack,
TRADES [34] attack and a Saliency-
based adversarial attack, which is an
attack using saliency maps generated
by our method. These results are
shown in Table 4. It is clear that SAT
and PGD-SAT outperform or have
comparable performance to (in case of
Uniform Noise) competing methods.
Expectedly, the improvement is much
more significant in case of Saliency-
based adversarial attack, since the method is closely associated with the attack.
Method Uniform-Noise TRADES Saliency Attack
 = 8
255
 = 16
255
 = 32
255
 = 2
255
 = 3
255
 = 4
255
 = 4
255
 = 8
255
 = 16
255
Original 62.21 47.88 21.17 39.59 35.1 33.45 13.03 6.86 3.92
Original + Uniform-Noise 67.42 60.75 28.9 46.98 39.37 37.8 19.63 10.48 6.1
SAT
Resnet-10 — Std — GBP 56.63 57.4 46.9 36.45 33.35 32.46 51.78 49.02 42.75
Resnet-10 — Adv. — GBP 66.63 57.93 21.92 45.93 40.80 37.86 62.99 56.48 43.49
Resnet-10 — Adv. — G.CAM++ 64.00 54.84 23.43 44.31 38.28 35.71 63.86 63.87 63.66
PGD 50.96 51.0 48.69 49.03 47.63 45.34 44.03 34.77 21.04
PGD + Uniform-Noise 55.6 52.45 49.20 52.32 48.76 45.87 45.72 32.81 16.62
PGD-SAT
Resnet-10 — Std — G.BP 52.78 52.56 49.21 50.43 47.69 46.24 47.25 46.74 44.95
Resnet-10 — Adv. — G.BP 54.38 54.13 50.30 51.58 49.15 46.83 50.61 50 47.64
Resnet-10 — Adv. — G.CAM++ 53.30 52.76 49.74 50.87 48.42 46.31 50.69 50.63 50.54
Table 4. Results against other attacks: Uniform-Noise, TRADES and Saliency. (GBP=
Guided-Backprop; G.CAM++=Grad-CAM++; l∞ perturbation ∈ [−, ].)
Using Other Saliency Maps: We also performed a study where we trained our
models using stronger saliency maps obtained using methods such as Smooth-
Grad [24], Guided Grad-CAM++ [3] and Integrated Gradients [26] from teacher
models. These models are evaluated using a 5-Step PGD attack with l∞ max-
perturbation  ∈ { 1255 , 2255 , 3255 , 4255}. As can be seen from Table 3, we tend to
achieve more robust models for better saliency maps.
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Conclusion. In summary, this work explores the interesting connection between
saliency maps and adversarial robustness to propose a Saliency based Adversar-
ial training (SAT) method. SAT imitates adversarial training by using saliency
maps to mimic adversarial perturbations. In particular, our methodology allows
the use of annotations such as bounding boxes and segmentation masks to be
exploited as weak explanations to improve model’s robustness with no additional
computations required to compute the perturbations themselves. Our results on
CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, Tiny ImageNet and Flowers-17 corroborate our claim.
We further gain improvement over popular adversarial training methods by in-
tegrating SAT with them (PGD-SAT and TRADES-SAT). Further, our work
shows how using better saliency maps leads to more robust models. Our ef-
fort opens rather a new direction to enhance robustness of DNNs by exploiting
saliency maps, and inspires the need for strong saliency maps to be provided
with vision datasets, which helps train adversarially robust models with little
overhead. Our future work includes ways to improve SAT by reasoning about the
class closest to the ground truth in terms of decision boundary, and improving
our estimates of adversarial perturbations.
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Appendix
In this appendix, we include additional results that could not be included in the
main paper due to space constraints.
Dataset details: CIFAR-10 is a subset of 80 million tiny images dataset and
consists of 60,000 32× 32 color images containing one of 10 object classes, with
6000 images per class. CIFAR-100 is just like CIFAR-10, except that it has 100
classes containing 600 images each. There are 500 training images and 100 testing
images per class. Tiny Imagenet has 200 classes, with each class containing 500
training images, 50 validation images, and 50 test images. The images are of
resolution 64 x 64. FLOWER-17 is a 17 category flower dataset with 80 images
for each class. The flowers chosen are some common flowers in the UK. The
images have large scale, pose and light variations and there are also classes with
large variations of images within the class and close similarity to other classes.
Time Efficiency: In Figure 6, we report the training efficiency of proposed
methods for CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets. As evident from the figure, we
achieve analogous results as Tiny-Imagenet and Flower-17 (see Fig 4 of main
submission).
Fig. 6. Training time for one epoch in seconds (averaged over 10 trials) for different
methods considered in our results on CIFAR-10/-100.
Robustness to Stronger PGD Attacks: As shown in the main paper (Section
4), our trained student models are robust against the 5-Step PGD [16] attack.
We also studied the effect of even stronger attacks on our trained student mod-
els. The models are evaluated using 20-Step and 40-Step PGD attacks with l∞
max-perturbation  ∈ { 1255 , 2255 , 3255 , 4255}. These results are shown in Table 6.
As the results show, our models show similar improvements in robustness even
on these stronger attacks.
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Method  = 1/255  = 2/255  = 3/255
Original 1.04 0.4 0.0
Original + Uniform-Noise 9.45 2.32 0.77
SAT (Weak Saliency)
Resnet-10 — Std. — G.CAM++ 9.35 1.95 0.74
Resnet-10 — Adv. — G.CAM++ 9.68 2.30 0.80
SAT (Fine Saliency)
Resnet-10 — Std. — GBP 3.02 0.0 0.0
Resnet-10 — Adv. — GBP 10.69 2.81 1.27
Bounding Boxes 9.79 2.46 0.77
PGD 18.91 14.34 11.37
PGD + Uniform-Noise 19.57 15.49 11.66
PGD-SAT
Resnet-10 — Std. — GBP 19.09 15.2 11.54
Resnet-10 — Adv. — GBP 20.6 16.38 12.96
Resnet-10 — Adv. — G.CAM++ 19.32 15.38 11.76
Bounding Boxes 20.56 16.38 12.91
TRADES 18.45 16.76 11.09
TRADES + Uniform-Noise 19.96 16.13 12.58
TRADES-SAT
Resnet-10 — Std. — GBP 19.57 16.22 11.82
Resnet-10 — Adv. — GBP 19.83 16.9 12.26
Resnet-10 — Adv. — G.CAM++ 20.5 16.38 12.93
Bounding Boxes 20.04 16.45 12.96
Table 5. Results of improved robustness on Tiny-Imagenet.  ∈ {1/255, 2/255, 3/255}
denotes the maximum l∞ perturbation allowed in 5-step PGD attack (More the ,
stronger the attack). GBP: Guided-Backpropagation; G.CAM++: Grad-CAM++.
More Results on Tiny-Imagenet: In addition to the results reported in Sec-
tion 4 of the main paper, we report a tabulation of our results on Tiny-Imagenet
dataset on PGD-SAT and TRADES-SAT in Table 5 (which we could not include
in main paper due to space constraints). We use Guided-Backpropagation [25] as
well as Grad-CAM++ [3] (written as G.CAM++) explanations of a Resnet-10
standard/adversarially trained teacher. We also report results when the bound-
ing boxes available in Tiny-ImageNet are used as (weak) saliency maps to show
the effectiveness of our methodology in scenarios where they are available.
Using Saliency Maps of Sparse Teachers: We add another variation in the
quality of saliency maps wherein we use the saliency maps of a sparse teacher
model (with 95% of total weights as zero) whose classification performance is
however comparable to a dense equivalent model. We observed that saliency
maps of sparse teachers are slightly better than standard ones but not better
than that of adversarially trained teachers and expect similar behavior when
used in SAT. Therefore, we trained SAT and PGD-SAT models on CIFAR-10
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Method Attack  = 1/255  = 2/255  = 3/255  = 4/255
Original
PGD-20 27.17 6.94 2.24 0.81
PGD-40 27.08 6.86 2.06 0.72
Original + Uniform-Noise
PGD-20 36.39 12.22 5.25 2.29
PGD-40 36.45 12.1 5.14 2.18
SAT
Resnet-10 — Std — GBP
PGD-20 20.87 7.25 2.76 1.21
PGD-40 20.92 7.18 2.6 1.19
Resnet-10 — Adv. — GBP
PGD-20 34.79 13.94 5.28 2.38
PGD-40 34.97 13.97 5.2 2.27
Resnet-10 —Adv. — G.CAM++
PGD-20 33.46 12.55 5.06 2.37
PGD-40 33.52 12.46 4.98 2.27
PGD
PGD-20 45.75 40.09 35.19 30.67
PGD-40 45.76 40.09 35.18 30.65
PGD + Uniform-Noise
PGD-20 50.76 41.61 35.05 30.58
PGD-40 50.75 41.63 35.03 30.52
PGD-SAT
Resnet-10 — Std — GBP
PGD-20 44.89 39 34.14 29.23
PGD-40 44.89 39.02 34.14 29.17
Resnet-10 — Adv. — GBP
PGD-20 48.10 42.13 36.16 31.1
PGD-40 48.11 42.14 36.14 31.07
Resnet-10 — Adv. — G.CAM++
PGD-20 47.29 41.69 35.98 30.96
PGD-40 47.29 41.69 35.92 30.93
Table 6. Improved robustness to stronger PGD attacks on CIFAR-100. GBP: Guided-
Backpropogation; G.CAM+: Grad-CAM++.
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using Guided-Backpropogation [25] of Resnet-10/Resnet-34 sparse teachers to
provide the saliency map. Table 7 shows our results. We notice that in most
cases, using saliency maps of sparse teachers leads to reasonable improvement
as compared to saliency maps of the standard teacher but short of adversarially
trained teachers.
Method  = 1/255  = 2/255  = 3/255  = 4/255
Original 47.71 10.36 1.39 0.28
Original + Uniform-Noise 61.23 22.85 6.34 2.56
SAT
Resnet-10 — Std. — GBP 10.87 0.95 0.0 0.0
Resnet-10 — Adv. — GBP 63.33 26.79 9.62 3.69
Resnet-34 — Std. — GBP 18.01 2.54 1.25 1.0
Resnet-34 — Adv. — GBP 62.67 23.76 5.82 1.28
Resnet-10 — Sparse — GBP 52.43 26.79 5.82 1.97
Resnet-34 — Sparse — GBP 60.18 23.56 8.58 2.76
PGD 77.89 73.1 66.96 61.18
PGD + Uniform-Noise 82.23 74.97 65.61 55.04
PGD-SAT
Resnet-10 — Std. — GBP 79.72 73.81 67.72 61.29
Resnet-10 — Adv. — GBP 80.72 75.07 68.68 62.49
Resnet-34 — Std. — GBP 79.53 74.2 68.19 62.48
Resnet-34 — Adv. — GBP 80.15 74.60 68.47 62.53
Resnet-10 — Sparse — GBP 79.48 73.97 67.72 61.77
Resnet-34 — Sparse— GBP 79.42 74.38 68.48 62.48
Table 7. Results of improved robustness on CIFAR-10 using saliencies extracted from
sparse teachers using guided-backpropagation.  ∈ {1/255, 2/255, 3/255, 4/255} de-
notes the maximum l∞ perturbation allowed in 5-step PGD attack (More the , stronger
the attack).
Integrating Multiple Saliency Maps In the main paper (Section 4), we
show how integrating our estimated perturbations (SAT) with true adversarial
perturbations leads to further improvement. It seems obvious then to question
about the effect of using more than one saliency maps in SAT. To study this, we
assess the contribution of using a combination of two saliency maps in SAT. For
getting two different saliency maps, we either change: (1) model architecture
(Resnet-10, Resnet-34) or (2) training procedure (Sparse, Adv). We therefore
select the saliency map to be used in SAT (Algorithm 1 in main paper) randomly
between these two maps. We report our findings in Table 8 (Shown using ’+’
symbol) for CIFAR-10. We observe that using a combination of saliency maps
leads to improvement in some cases. The cases where the improvement is more,
include saliency maps which have different characteristics. This can be attributed
to the fact that coming from slightly two different distributions, the saliency
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maps now cover different types of adversarial perturbations than their singular
equivalents. Consequently, one can infer that if richer saliency maps, perhaps
from different sources of reasonable divergence are available, one can leverage
them to improve performance further.
Method  = 1/255  = 2/255  = 3/255  = 4/255
Original 47.71 10.36 1.39 0.28
Original + Uniform-Noise 61.23 22.85 6.34 2.56
SAT
Resnet-10 — Std. — GBP 10.87 0.95 0.0 0.0
Resnet-10 — Adv. — GBP 63.33 26.79 9.62 3.69
Resnet-34 — Std. — GBP 18.01 2.54 1.25 1.0
Resnet-34 — Adv. — GBP 62.67 23.76 5.82 1.28
Resnet-10 — Adv. — GBP + Resnet-34 — Adv. — GBP 63.2 24.2 6.58 1.71
Resnet-10 — Adv. — GBP + Resnet-34 — Sparse — GBP 71.01 39.94 19.0 8.64
Resnet-10 — Sparse — GBP + Resnet-34 — Adv. — GBP 66.47 35.19 15.0 6.11
Resnet-10 — Sparse— GBP + Resnet-34 — Sparse — GBP 60.07 29.11 11.26 4.55
Table 8. Results of improved robustness on CIFAR-10 by integrat-
ing saliencies extracted from different teachers and explanation methods.
 ∈ {1/255, 2/255, 3/255, 4/255} denotes the maximum l∞ perturbation allowed
in 5-step PGD attack (More the , stronger the attack). ’+’ denotes which two
saliencies are integrated together.
